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In the Supreme Court of the
State of Utah
VERNON J. SMITH,

i
'

Plaintiff and Appellant,
vs.
WILMER LEE BARNETI,
Defendant and Respondent.

(

)

CASE
NO. 10320

Appellant's Petition for Re-Hearing and
Brief in Support Thereof
Appellant, Vernon J. Smith, petitions the Court for
re-hearing in the above case upon the grounds hereinafter
set forth. In support of said petition, appellant relies upon
the following points:
POINT I
THE SUPREME COURT FAILED TO RULE UPON
POINTS RAISED BY THE APPELLANT IN ms BRIEF.
POINT II
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY INSTRUCTING
THE JURY ON UNAVOIDABLE ACCIDENT.

2
POINT ID

THE INSTRUCTIONS TO THE JURY AS A WHOLE
WERE PREJUlDICIAL TO THE PLAINTIFF.
WHEREFORE, Appellant prays that the petition for
re-hea.rng be granted and that upon such re-hearing and
after consideration of the record and the law, the decision
of the Court be recalled and a decision entered in favor
of the Appellant and the case remanded to the lower court
for a new trial with direction to the lower court concern·
ing proper jury instructions.

S. Rex Lewis, for
Howard and Lewis
Attorneys for Appellant

Brief in Support of Petition for Rehearing
POINT I

THE SUPREME COURT FAILED TO RULE UPON
POINTS RAISED BY THE APPELLANT IN HIS BRIEF.
It is respectfully urged to this Court that the points
presented by Appellant, points II through point VI, were
not ruled upon by this Court as provided in the Utah Con·
stitution, Article vm, Section 25, which states as follows:
"When a judgment or decree is reversed, modified
or affirmed by the Supreme Court, the reasons therefor shall be stated concisely in writing, signed by the
judges concurring, filed in the office of the Clerk"

the Supreme Court, and preserved with a record of
the case. Any judge dissenting therefrom, may give
the reasons of his dissent in writing over his · •

ture.,,

s1gna

Rule 76(a) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure also
states the law as follows:
"Every decision of the Court, together with the
reasons therefor concisely stated shall be in writing
and filed with the Clerk. Any justice dissenting may
likewise give his reasons therefor in writing and fiie
the same in the case."
This Court in its initial opinion disposed of Appellant's
Point II through Point VI as follows:
"Plaintiff claims prejudicial error on account of the
Court's failure to give certain requested instructions
(3) and its giving a number of other instructions. We
have carefully analyzed these claims and find no merit
in them."
This Court cited as (3) the case of Wellman vs. Noble,
12 Utah 2d, 350, 366 P2d 701, in whidl this Court held
that it was not error to refuse to give an instruction on
unavoidable accident. Appellant agrees with the Court
that it is not error to fail to give an instruction on unavoidable accident. Failure to give such instruction was
not involved in the present case. The present case involves
the giving of an instruction on unavoidable accident when the facts do not merit such an instruction and the giving
of Which instruction Appellant claims is prejudicial error
as to his claim. Appellant respectfully urges this Court
to make a specific ruling upon the lower court's giving an
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~ction on unavoidable accident in a pedestrian-automobile case such as this case is and encompassing the facts
as presented -in this case.
POINT II
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY INSTRUCTING
THE JURY ON UNAVOIDABLE ACCIDENT.

Apparently Appellant· failed in his brief or in oral argument to adequately explain to the court the facts involved in this case and that the giving of an instruction
on unavoidable accident was prejudicial error as to the
Plaintiff herein~ The Court, in its initial opinion filed herein, states the
More particularly the. Court has stated that "the Plaintiff, while walking south in line with the sidewalk on the east side of State
Street had covered about 2/3 of the distance of the entrance when he was struck by Defendant's car, which
had come from the. north on State Street and was making
a turn. -to east into Rainbow Drive. It was a dark, dry
njght with some street lights."
There . are no cases encompassing the facts as they
existed in this case as this Court has found them to be
where the courts have failed to say that giving of an instruction encompassing unavoidable accident was not prejudicial and reversible error.
The Defendant, in his brief, found one recent NeW
Mexiro case wherein the court approved an instruction on
unavoidable accident, which is the case of Faulkner vs.
Martin, .75 N.Mex, 159, 391 P2d 660 (1964). It is respectfacts as the. ;plaintiff contends they were.
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fully pointed out to this Court that the New Mexico case,
though not exactly in point, is a poorly reasoned case and
that the dissent in th New Mexico case is well reasoned
and complies with the majority rule. The dissenting justice in the New Mexico case agrees with the Plaintiff
herein and cites 65 ~R 2d 12, 85. The dissent also states
that people do not "loom" in front of cars, absent fog or
smog or similar vision obstruction.
The overwhelming weight of authority in the majority
of cases is to the effect that such an instruction encompassing unavoidable accident involving the striking of p&
destrians at or neaT a street intersection is prejudicial and
rGversible error. The California Supreme Court holds it
is error in any case. Butigan vs. Yellow Cab Co., 49 Cal
2d. 652, 320 P2d. 500. This Court in the case of Wellman
vs. Noble, Supra, wherein this Court affirmed the lower
court in its failure to instruct on wmvoida'ble accident stated, p. 352: "Here the issue of unavoidable accident is not
involved any more than in practically any other accideat
case." (Emphasis added)
This Court is again referred to the Annotation in 65
ALR 2d p. 85, wherein it states that in the majority of
the cases involving the striking of pedestrians at or near
street intersections, instructions on unavoidable accident
and inevitable accident instructions have been considered
inappropriate and reversible error. Plaintiff refers the
Court to the annotation and quotes some of the cases as
follows:
"McBride vs. Woods (1950) 124 Colo 384, 238 P2d
183-Where the mishap resulted when the Defendant,
whose car was parked diagonally, in a place marked near
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a street: ~te~~· backed the car out in daylight, slowly,
but strikmg Plamtiff, an elderly person who was passing
on the crosswalk and moving somewhat in the direction
the vehicle was backed. The Defendant did not see the
Plaintiff, nor was he immediately aware that he had struck
her, and he testified that, 'It was not possible to back out
of that pru-king space and miss the car ahead and get into
my own lane without backing into the crosswalk.' He conceded that the bum~r of his car was backed into the crosswalk a distance of about 3 feet. The court following a
verdict for the ~fendant held it was error to submit to the
jlll'Y the question of unavoidable accident, 'where there is
absolutely no evidence in the case which warrants a sub·
mission' of such question, 'all evidence clearly showing that
the accident could have been avoided.'" (Emphasis added)
P. 86. In Quillin vs. Colquhoun, (1925) 42 Idaho 522,
247, P. 740--wherein a pedestrian suffered injuries at or
near a street intersection, the court, in reversing the judg·
ment for Defendant, disapproved of the inclusion of the
words "an accident" in the instruction that if the jW'Y
found from a preponderance of evidence that the misad·
venture "was an accident and not attributable to the neg·
ligence of anyone" the verdict should be for the Defendant.

In the Missouri case of Jones vs. Goldberg,
78 SW2d 509--a pedestrian was injw."'ed at a street inter·
section. It was held that the evidence merely presented

P. 86.

issues- of negligence and contributory negligence, that there
was no basis for the giving of a so-called accident instfUC·
tion to the effect that if Plaintiff's injuries were caused by
an accident, mischance or misfortune, and not by any neg·
ligence on the part of the defendant contributing thereto,
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plaintiff was not entitled to recover. Consequently it was
held that the giving of the instruction was error and warranted the trial court in granting a. new trial after a verdict for the defendant. (Emphasis added)
P. 89. In the case of Orr vs. Hart, (1934) 219 Iowa
408, 258 NW 84-a street pedestrian case, it was held error
to give an unavoidable accident instruction inasmuch as
"the record shows conclusively that this accident happened
through the fault and negligence of one or bo1lh of the parties thereto.'" (Emphasis added)
P. 89. In the case of Smith vs. Johnson (1954) 2 m.
App. 2d 315, 120 NE 2d 58---a case of injury to a street
pedestrian, it was held error to give an accident instruc- .
tion inasmuch as there was no evidence that the pedestrian' s injuries were sustained by accident alone not coupled with negligence.
P. 89. In Levans vs. Vigne, (1936) 339 Mo. 550, 98
SW2d 737-a street pedestrian case, it was held not error
to refuse to give an accident instruction since the case presented an issue of negligence of defendant and not of cu-.
ualty from an unknown cause.
It is stated in 1 Blashfield Encyclopedia of Automobile·
Law & Practice, Section 635, Ohapter 15, p. 485:
"A mere accident being one in which neither party
is at fault the mere fact that neither drtver of two
automobil~ coUiding with each other saw the other
until too late to avoid the collision is not enough to
show that the accident was unavoidable, since in such
a case the negligence, if any, producing the situation determines the liability, so that if either party can
avold an accident by the exercise of proper ca.re it cannot be said to be unavoidable. For example, if a blow~

...
8
out occurs but the driver of the car is reckless ti
blowout is no defense."
' i.e
. "In other words, the issue of unavoidable accident
arises only under evidence showing the accident happened from an unknown or unforeseen cause or in an
unexplainable manner, which circumstances rebut defendant' s allegd negligence.* * *"
In this case, the Plaintiff was walking back to his place
of business on the sidewalk on the east side of State Street.

The Plaintiff looked to his left, or east cm Rainbow Drive,
for traffic that may have been going west on Rainbow
Drive. Plaintiff looked for traffic coming north on State
Street and Plaintiff looked to his right to see if any vehicles were in the left-turn lane for southbound tTaffic.
There was no traffic in the left-turn lane for southbound
traffic when the Plaintiff proceeded to cro~ Rainbow Avenue going south to his place of business. Plaintiff had
walked 2/3 of the way across Rainbow Drive, or 24 feet
8 inches, which would have taken him approximtely 6 sec·
onds, when he saw the Defendant's car lights on him just
prior to impact. Plaintiff cried out to stop and attemp·
ted to get out of the way, but could not. Plaintiff was
run down by the Defendant in the cross walk, a sitting
duck for the Defendant's well-aimed automobile. It is ob·
vious that the Defendant did not look to the sidewalk or
crosswalk area when he came into his left-turn lane.
There was oncoming traffic, and the Defendant turned in
front of the oncoming traffic.
State Street is a lighted street and persons are visib~e
upon the sidewalks and crossings along the street. It JS
obvious that when a person turns his vehicle he does not

have his head locked in a straight forward position, but
that he does or should turn his head and eyes as he turns
his vehicle. It is also obvious, and should be a matter of
judicial notice, that headlights do not shoot a straight ·
beam like a piece of steel, but that headlights diffuse to
the left and to the right. Headlights light up an area. at
right ·angles from the direction the beam is pointed. If
the Defendant were unable to see to his left while makng
his left turn, had he looked, he should have exercised extreme caution and even stopped, if necessary, so that he
could see into the crosswalk area. It is further obvious
that once the Defendant had left turned and crossed the
traveled lanes of fu'affic, he had an additional 12 or 15 feet
which was parking area that he crossed prior to reaching
the sidewalk area during which time and distance his ve- ·
hicle was facing directly into Rainbow Drive. It seems
obviously apparent that a vehicle will not stop within one
or two feet as testified to by the Defendant when he struck .
the Plaintiff. It also appears obvious that the Defendant
was struck and knocked a distance of 20 feet, which. impact dented the metal hood of the Defendant'& car and.
caused grave injuries to the Plantiff resulting in a .subdural hydrorna requiring an operation, and a ni.pttued .diSc
in his neck that required a fusion.
1

It should be readily apparent there was a miscarriage
of justice, and that the Plaintiff is entitled to damages fM ··
his injuries sustained. It further should be apparent that
the instruction on unavoidable accident may have been
fatal to the Plaintiff's claim, and that the giving of the
instruction was confusing and misleading to the jury, and
that the giving of the instruction overemphasized the-~·.. ·
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fendant's case. The jury may also have considered that
unavoidability was an issue or ground of defense separate
and apart from the question of negligence and proximate
causation.
Plaintiff adopts the position of this Court as stated in
the Wellman vs. Noble case (Supra) that "Here the issue
of unavoidable accident is not involved any more than in
practically any other accident case."
If an unavoidable accident instruction is proper in this
case, it may fairly be stated that it should be proper in
practically any accident case. Plaintiff firmly believes this

is not the law in this jurisdiction, that such instructions
are not proper, are reversible error, and that this Cowt
should so hold.

POINT III
THE INSTRUCTIONS TO THE JURY AS A WHOLE

WERE PREJUDICIAL TO THE PLAINTIFF.
This Court is referred to its decision in the case of
Taylor vs Johnson, 15 U2d. 342, 393 P2d 382, wherein the
instructions to the jury weTe disected by this Court, and
this COurt concluded that, p. 350, "the instructions were
misleading to the jury as to what would constitute negli·
gence; that they were repetitious, and many of them were
premised on factual situations which were not supported
by the evidence. In vfow of the whole situation, the court
committed prejudicial error in emphasizing its mstruc·
tions as it did in favor of the Defendant and against the
Plaintiff, and that therefore the Plaintiff is entitled to a

new trial"
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It has been previously pointed out to this Court that
the lower court's instructions overemphasized the Defend-

ant's defense, including the order of the instructions and by
wrongfully including an instruction on unavoidable accident premised on a factual situation which was not supported by the evidence.
CONCLUSION

The Plaintiff respectfully submits to this Court that
its prior ruling on this appeal failed to consider the matter
of prejudicial and reversible error by the court's giving
the unavoidable accident instruction. Plaintiff strongly
urges upon this Court that such error committed by the
trial court was reversible, and that this case should be
remanded to the lower court for a new trial, with directions to the lower court concerning proper jw-y instructions.
Respectfully submitted,
S. REX LEWIS, for
HOWARD AND LEWIS
Delphi Building
120 East Third North
Provo, Utah
Attorney for Appellant

